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A paper inspired by Richard Swinburne’s God and Morality
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Th e John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Let us imagine two possible worlds, similar to ours. Th ey are both the 
same in all non-moral respects with the exception of one component: 
in the fi rst world God exists and is the creator of all that exists (apart 
from Him) in this world; in the second world, God does not exist. Do 
the two worlds – the world-with-God and the world-without-God (the 
Godless world) – diff er as to their moral contents? Richard Swinburne (if 
I understand him correctly) says yes1. According to him, the “moral” dif-
ferences between the two worlds are considerable, although they do not 
concern the essence of morality itself. Both worlds are equally “moral” 
in the sense that there are moral properties in them; these properties are 
in a sense supervenient on non-moral properties and independent of the 
existence and activity of God. Th e world-with-God, however, is morally 
“richer” than the world-without-God, but only in the sense that:
(I) Th e existence of God – the creator and benefactor – entails some 
additional and specifi c obligations for people: they are obliged to obey 
and worship Him. Th ese obligations are analogous to our obligations to-
wards our parents, lawful and just rulers, or persons (benefactors) that 
deserve special respect. 
1 R. Swinburne, “God and Morality”, Th ink 20, vol. 7 (Winter 2008), pp. 7-15 (cf. also 
R. Swinburne, “What Diff erence Does God Make to Morality?”, [in:] R.K. Garcia, N.L. 
King, Is Goodness without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism, and Ethics, 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefi eld Publishers 2008, pp. 151-163). I present Swinburne’s 
theses by means of a conceptual apparatus somewhat diff erent than his. In this text I use 
the terminology of possible worlds. Swinburne has used this terminology only twice. 
I distance myself here from the problem of the ontological and methodological status of 
possible worlds. I treat them only as hypothetical equivalents of certain global possibili-
ties (of all that exists). 
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(II) God may aff ect moral “facts” through creating (or not creating) 
states of aff airs on which (by necessity and independently of His will) 
particular moral properties are supervenient. To use an example other 
than Swinburne’s: if ammunition, shot at people, did not of its nature 
cause death or wounds, but pleasure, then shooting at innocent or un-
armed people would, in principle, be not a bad act (or not as bad as it is 
in our actual world).
(III) God, as the highest epistemic and deontic authority, may (espe-
cially by way of revelation) teach us about our obligations or enhance our 
motivation to implement them. He may also formulate (within limits) 
some additional commands that help people to accomplish their (most 
fundamental) good.
Let us assume that we agree with Swinburne with regard to the above 
“moral diff erences” between the worlds under consideration2. Contrary 
to Swinburne, I think that these diff erences entail diff erences as to the 
nature of morality: morality in the world-with-God is indeed something 
diff erent than morality in the world-without-God. In order to realise this 
let us have a closer look at the diff erences (I)-(III).
 
OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS GOD
If there is a God – a rational creator and benefactor – then we not only 
have some specifi c obligations towards Him, but all our obligations are 
(at least indirectly) obligations towards Him. Why?
In the world-with-God everything that exists (apart from Him) exists 
thanks to Him, is the result of His conscious, free and gratuitous act of 
2 I think that the most debatable thing in Swinburne’s reasoning is that he treats 
moral properties as logical consequences of non-moral properties. It is not clear how the 
second (by virtue of logical or quasi-logical necessity) should determine the fi rst. I omit 
here this question, although some of my remarks may be treated as certain suggestions 
towards solving this problem. Let me add something which seems obvious, namely that 
both Swinburne and I presuppose that in both possible worlds – with God and without 
God – there are people who are free and responsible moral subjects. Th ereby we presup-
pose that neither God’s omniscience, and omnipotence, (appropriately understood) nor 
natural laws (appropriately understood) exclude man’s real freedom. Th e argumentation 
on behalf of this presupposition, and discussion of attendant problems, go beyond the 
framework of this text.
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creation. In this world all our obligations – both natural and contrac-
tual – towards whoever (or whatever) are therefore obligations towards 
God. Persons or things towards which we have obligations exist and bear 
obligation-making properties just because of God’s creative act. We owe 
honour to our parents since they are the most proximate source of our ex-
istence. However, although we have received our existence by the media-
tion of certain created beings, ultimately, we have received our existence, 
and our parents, only from God. He is therefore (as Swinburne writes) 
‘much more the source of our being than are our parents’3. As we can see, 
in the theistic perspective gratitude, honour and obedience to parents 
are, ultimately, (though not directly) gratitude, honour, and obedience to 
God Himself, as the ultimate source of our parents. In like manner, we 
can say about all beings created by God, towards which we have obliga-
tions: these obligations are indirectly obligations towards God. Th e rela-
tionship of being obligated, like the relationship of existential derivation 
(or of being caused), seems to be a transitive relationship.
It follows from the above that all moral obligations in the world-with-
God reach much further than obligations in the world-without-God. In 
the fi rst world our obligations are always also obligations towards the 
being on Whom we are ontically dependent and Who is fully (insofar 
as this is logically possible) rational and good. In the second world our 
obligations are always obligations exclusively towards beings limited 
with respect to their ontological status, rationality, and goodness. In this 
sense, morality in the world-with-God is absolute, and morality in the 
world-without-God is relative. We may discuss our duties towards be-
ings to whom we owe only a little, and who are only partially rational and 
good. However, it is diffi  cult to do this in relation to the being to Whom 
we owe everything and Who is entirely rational and good.
GOD’S INFLUENCE ON MORALITY
According to Swinburne, in the world-with-God ‘God brings about the 
circumstances which (in virtue of some necessary moral truth) make 
3 Swinburne, God and Morality, p. 11.
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an action of some kind good or bad’4. Th is thesis is illustrated by Swin-
burne’s example of capital punishment and my example of shooting (see 
above). I think that God’s creative prerogatives, in relation to morality in 
the world-with-God, have much more important consequences. Let us 
note that:
 (a) if God did not create any beings – or non-moral properties – 
there would not exist any moral properties supervenient on 
those beings or non-moral properties;
 (b) if God created only non-personal beings, the moral properties 
supervenient on them would exist at most potentially, being 
made actual only in the moment when persons come into exist-
ence;
 (c) if God created a world radically diff erent from ours with respect 
to non-moral contents, it would diff er from our world also with 
respect to moral contents: the lack of certain beings (or non-
moral properties) would result in the lack of certain moral prop-
erties, and the existence of other beings, or non-moral proper-
ties (unknown to us), would entail the existence of other moral 
properties (somewhat new to us).
I am not going to speculate here how far our world could be diff erent 
(in its non-moral and moral respects). It suffi  ces to note that once we 
accept (a)-(c), we are brought to the conclusion that in the world-with-
God, God’s decisions are (at least) a necessary condition of the existence 
of morality (see the points a-b) and a necessary condition of the moral 
contents (see point c). Such being the case, the metaphorical (analogous) 
statement that God is the “author” or “giver” of morality turns out to 
be obviously justifi ed (for those inhabitants of the world-with-God who 
are aware of this fact). One may even say: God, in creating beings that 
found morality, is (indirectly) the creator of morality; by deciding what 
exists and how it exists, God (indirectly) decides what is good or bad and 
how it is good or bad. Th e fact that sense qualities supervene on light or 
sound waves etc., and aesthetic qualities supervene on sense qualities, 
does not undermine the theist’s belief that God is the creator of sense and 
4 Ibid., p. 10.
203MORALIT Y,  GOD, AND POSSIBLE WORLDS
aesthetic qualities, and that they were consciously projected or designed 
by Him. For this same reason the consequent theist should recognise 
that morality (the set of non-moral properties and their resultant moral 
properties or normative propositions) is God’s conscious work5. Now 
the consequent atheist should recognise that morality is a “brute fact” or 
a fact that is supervenient on the “brute fact” of the contingent existence 
of our actual world. Obviously, the atheist may also say that morality 
supervenes on the non-moral contents of our world, which exists and is 
such as it is of necessity, or thanks to rational “self-regulation.” Th is posi-
tion seems, however, fairly peculiar and it is an example of pantheism 
rather than atheism.
ADDITIONAL COMMANDS
If God can indirectly create morality – (i) as the ultimate correlate of 
moral obligations and (ii) as the creator of (this and not another) “onto-
logical foundation” of morality – then why could He not make it directly? 
Th e absolute sovereignty of God the Creator entails His ontic power and 
deontic right to directly determine such moral obligations that are not 
(only) the consequence of His existence or the consequence of the exist-
ence of the non-moral contents of the world created by Him.
5 God is absolutely free, but within the confi nes of his own – rational and good – 
nature (the scholastics sought to describe this by means of the fi rst principles of being, 
knowledge, and morality). Once we assume this thesis we may – following Swinburne’s 
approach – solve the Euthyphro dilemma: part of our duties results from God’s decision, 
and part of them results from the fact that they are good as such. (I am leaving aside here 
the quantitative and qualitative defi nition of these “parts”). Th is does not lead to antithe-
istic consequences, if we bear in mind that any free decisions on God’s part are decisions 
of a being with a concrete – rational and good – nature, and this nature of God, that de-
termines good (and indirectly evil), is something internal to Him. As we can see, God 
does not have to be redundant in moral explanation, and the morality established by Him 
does not have to be arbitrary. I omit here the solutions of the dilemma based directly on 
the doctrine of God’s simplicity. According to E. Stump (Simplicity, [in:] P.L. Quinn, Ch. 
Taliaferro (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
1999, p. 225), God is ‘identical with perfect goodness’ and God’s simplicity entails that 
‘there is an essential relationship between God and the standard for moral goodness, and 
that standard is not external to God.’
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Swinburne seems to accept the above thesis, but his examples suggest 
not that God may add essential new duties (in relation to the “natural” 
morality that is supervenient on the non-moral contents of the world), 
but, rather, that He may enhance, make clear, or develop the existing and 
“natural” duties. For the inhabitants of the world-with-God it is justi-
fi ed to assume that since the recognition of the moral consequences of 
non-moral properties is diffi  cult and causes confl icts, one may expect 
that God will directly help people to recognise moral good and bad, and 
assist in their moral betterment, by means of revelation (confi rmed by 
miraculous signs). I think, however, that for the inhabitants of this world 
it is justifi ed to assume also that God (by means of revelation) may not 
only (as Swinburne suggests) interpret, or partially correct, the moral-
ity that already exists, but that He may add to it something radically 
new. Obviously, we can hardly expect that, in doing this, God should be 
inconsequent and order that which is “naturally” bad or prohibit that 
which is “naturally” good. However, it is a fact that in the world-with-
God some moral obligations may come directly from God’s commands, 
and not from the “natural” contents of the world; and that some of those 
additional obligations may be known only by virtue of God’s revelation, 
and not for instance through philosophical consideration. Such a cir-
cumstance does not occur in the world-without-God: in that world the 
range of moral obligations is smaller, and their recognition is brought 
about solely by means of natural human cognitive capacities.
Th e above point should be supplemented with one reservation. Just 
as it is not easy to determine the content of our “natural” obligations, it 
is diffi  cult, and perhaps even more diffi  cult, to determine whether and 
where God’s revelation was put into practice and what it contains. Th ere-
fore we have religious debates between believers of various religions and 
confessions. Such being the case, it is most prudent to base public life 
on “natural morality,” and on its interpretation, which – as Swinburne 
writes – is ‘a result of discussion and experience over many centuries’6. 
Any additional commands which may possibly arise through revelation 
should, then, be treated as obligatory only for those who have recognised 
these commands as coming directly from God, and as binding for them, 
by virtue of their personal or communal relationship with God7.
6 Swinburne, God and Morality, p. 8. 
7 Th e Decalogue may be interpreted either as a set of revealed Divine commandments 
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SWINBURNE AND THE MORAL ARGUMENT
As we can see, in this commentary to Swinburne’s article I have tried 
to prove that the moral diff erences between the world-with-God and the 
world-without-God are much greater than Swinburne suggests. I have 
not undermined, however, his main thesis ‘that the existence and actions 
of God make no diff erence to the fact that there are moral truths, but 
that they make a great diff erence to what those truths are’8. Indeed in 
both worlds there are moral truths. In the world-without-God, however, 
some moral truths – namely those that refer to God or those that are 
established by God – are, at most, counterfactual truths (“if God existed, 
then...”); while all ‘general principles of morality’ are necessary truths, 
though their application to the world is based on the “brute fact” of the 
existence of some contingent and non-moral states of aff airs, that, ul-
timately, are not intended by anyone. Now in the world-with-God the 
range of factual moral truths is greater, and their obligatoriness and ap-
plication to the world are based on the following:
 – either on the fact that God exists;
 – or on the fact that some non-moral states of aff airs have on pur-
pose been created by God;
 – or on the fact that God issued and revealed special commands 
or prohibitions.9
Th e above diff erences between the worlds under consideration lead to 
‘a great diff erence’ (greater than Swinburne suggests) in understanding 
(within the framework of particular religions) or as a cultural inscription of “natural” 
moral consciousness, whether derived from God or not. Th is consciousness would, for 
instance, be a consequence of the fact that an obligation-making value supervenes on 
human life, or on life in general; thus the principal commandment ‘thou shalt not kill!’ 
could be expressed positively as: protect life! Th e remaining commandments would indi-
cate (incompletely) various ways of protecting life: through the preservation of appropri-
ate relations with the sources of our life, whether more or less proximate, as well as with 
the means of life, and with those with whom we share our life.
8 Swinburne, God and Morality, p. 7.
9 Th e proponents of the so-called Divine Commands Ethics emphasise the latter pos-
sibility (see J.M. Idziak, Divine Commands Ethics, [in:] P.L. Quinn, Ch. Taliaferro (ed.), 
A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, op. cit., pp. 453 and 458). In the broad sense we 
fi nd its moderate or indirect representatives among all those who accept all the above 
three possibilities.
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morality: in the world-without-God morality is at most a consequence 
of a certain contingent complex of non-moral states of aff airs; whereas 
in the world-with-God it is the correlate and intended “work” of a per-
fect personal being. A diff erence in how we understand morality entails 
a diff erence in how we live it out. One may assume that, in being aware of 
the fact that God exists in their world, the inhabitants of the world-with-
God will live out their moral obligations as more absolute and exception-
less than the inhabitants of the world-without-God, who are aware of the 
fact that God does not exist in their world: indeed, the foundation and 
correlate of morality is something greater for the fi rst group than for the 
second.
Th e latter remark may be the basis for a certain version of an argu-
ment for the existence of God in the style of Swinburne. His arguments 
for the existence of God (together making up a cumulative argument) 
are based on a common procedure which, put simply, consists in prov-
ing that the theistic explanation of a given phenomenon (or a class of 
phenomena) is better (especially simpler) than some competing expla-
nations; in other words, it is more probable (or expected) that a given 
phenomenon (or a class of phenomena) will come about in the light of 
the theistic hypothesis than in the light of competing hypotheses.10
In order to apply the above procedure to the phenomenon of morality 
let us assume that the majority of people (in the whole history of man-
kind) experience morality as absolute and exceptionless, as something 
very serious and objectively binding. Let us ask then in which of the 
possible worlds – in the world-with-God or in the world-without-God 
– it is more probable (or expected) that such moral consciousness will 
occur. I think that the probability of the existence of such consciousness 
in the second world is small. Moral consciousness in this world could be 
a result of some coincidence, a result of biological or social processes, or 
simply an illusion.11 Such factors, however, can evoke various, and also 
contrary, eff ects. We can hardly expect factors of such mutability and 
accidentalness to evoke moral consciousness, which is permanent and 
10 Swinburne develops this type of argument in his book Th e Existence of God, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979 (reprinted 1987).
11 I do not take into consideration the non-naturalistic and at the same time non-the-
istic explanations of morality, for they seem to be too complicated, therefore they violate 
the criterion of explanatory simplicity.
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absolute. It is diff erent in the case of the fi rst world: if there is a rational 
and good God-Creator, then we may presume with high probability that 
(directly or indirectly) He will lead to the existence of moral conscious-
ness in people. He has both suffi  cient power and suffi  cient reasons to do 
this, e.g. He wants to preserve rational order in the life of free creatures 
created by Him and to show them His absolute and exceptional author-
ity. (In any case the fact of the existence of God makes absolute moral 
consciousness something understandable: it has sense only if there is 
a personal source of all beings, towards Whom we are absolutely morally 
obliged and responsible). If it is more probable (or expected) that the 
phenomenon under consideration should appear in the world-with-God 
than in the world-without-God, then it is more probable that the world 
in which we live, and in which this phenomenon occurs, is identical with 
the world-with-God, rather than with the world-without-God. I think 
that the above argument is formally correct. 
Let us end with one additional remark. Swinburne (Th e Existence of 
God, pp. 175-179) criticises the argument ‘from man’s moral conscious-
ness’, for according to him it is not diffi  cult ‘to explain [this phenom-
enon] by normal scientifi c [esp. evolutionary] processes’. I think, how-
ever, that this (scientifi c) explanation is possible, but not in relation to 
absolute moral consciousness, that corresponds to absolute, objective 
claims of moral obligation. According to Swinburne, an argument ‘from 
the fact of morality itself ’ is faulty, because the fundamental moral truths 
(principles) are analytically necessary and as such do not need expla-
nation. I think, however, that their necessity (which is, in my opinion, 
synthetic rather than analytic) is only conditional or relative, i.e. they are 
indeed related to the world insofar as there are some contingent non-
moral states of aff airs. Swinburne (though using a conceptual apparatus 
diff erent than mine) notices this fact and proposes to formulate the fol-
lowing argument from morality: ‘actions a, b, c, d, are obligatory; they 
would not be obligatory unless they were Q, R, S, T. It is more probable 
that there are actions which are Q, R, S, T, if there is a God than if there 
is not; therefore the obligatoriness of a, b, c, d, confi rms the existence of 
God.’ Swinburne, however, rejects this argument because it is diffi  cult 
to fi nd such actions accepted by standard ethical theories whose prob-
ability (of existence and obligation) rises together with the existence of 
God. In my opinion the probability of the obligatoriness of any actions 
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rises together with the existence of God because without His existence 
and creative action there could be no other beings or any obligations. 
However, the above statement transforms the moral argument into 
a metaphysical or cosmological argument. No wonder, then, that Swin-
burne states that: “I fi nd »the moral law within« considerably less good 
testimony to God than »the starry heavens above«”. Swinburne also 
states that the belief that “the voice of conscience is the voice of God” 
is only a consequence of our non-ethical knowledge about the existence 
and action of God. Despite this we may still be surprised by the fact that, 
in relation to natural phenomena, Swinburne ultimately uses personal 
explanation and not scientifi c (nomological) explanation, whereas in re-
lation to moral phenomena he goes the other way round. According to 
him, morality is not ultimately explained by the intentions and powers of 
a perfect person, but by certain laws of correlation between natural (non-
moral) and moral properties. Perhaps by postulating a personal explana-
tion of morality I would like to be more “Swinburnean” than Swinburne. 
Th e problem, however, consists in showing whether its main premise 
– the premise of the universal existence of absolute moral conscious-
ness – is true and whether the knowledge of its truth is independent of 
knowledge about the existence of God (or faith in the existence of God). 
One thing is certain: the debate on the character of moral consciousness 
and morality itself has been going on for ages, and in a sense it is con-
nected with the debate on the existence of God.
